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GEARON AND JACKSON  
 
David Lewin, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As a doctoral student in religious studies, I was involved in teaching on two undergraduate 
modules, one for first year students FDOOHG µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ5HOLJLon,¶ DQGDQRWKHU Ior more 
advanced undergraduates FDOOHG µ'HDWK RI *RG 7KHRORJ\¶ 6HQVLWLYH to the dangers of the 
colonisation of theology and religious studies by sociology of religion, I was struck that 
µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ 5HOLJLRQ¶ UHDOO\ DPRXQWHG WR VHFXODU and atheist explanations (both 
compelling but also rather reductive) of religion from figures such as Marx, Durkheim, 
Freud, and Frazer. By contrast µ'HDWK RI *RG 7KHRORJ\¶ LQYLWHG VWXGHQWV WR consider 
responses to cultural and religious changes from theologians like Bonhoeffer, Tillich, Rahner 
and Bultmann. This ((not really) ironic) reversal ± that understanding religion was not about 
engaging with theologians, but with theories about religion, and that the death of God should 
be investigated through a theological lens ± seemed to reflect the status of theology as a 
derivative science. It seemed that theology¶V place in the academy was colonised by secular 
theories about religion, theories that tended to address the outer shell of religion without 
getting to its heart. But it also suggested that the theological tradition was more diverse and 
complex, even self-subverting, than certain assumptions about the confessional nature of 
traditional university departments of theology or µGLYLQLW\¶PLJKWVXJJHVW 
 
Is there something about religion that can only be understood phenomenologically, from an 
inwardness that secular theories are methodologically disposed to resist? From Ninian Smart 
to John Milbank, or Terence Copley to Marius Felderhof, philosophers of religion have long 
raised such questions about the positioning of religion within education. A similar question 
seems to animate /LDP *HDURQ¶V FRQFHUQV WKDW WKH WKHRORJical grounding of religious 
education has been carelessly excavated by secularised discourses of social theory, 
particularly in the guise of current geopolitics and pluralist religious education. Often framed 
around the insider/outsider problem of understanding religion (McCutcheon 1999), such 
concerns are not new, but their application to religious education is apposite.1 As we shall 
VHH*HDURQ¶Vespecially timely intervention (particularly since 2013) addresses what he calls 
WKH µVHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶ RI UHOLJLRXV HGXFDWLRQ ZKHUHE\ WKH SUHYHQWLRQ RI H[WUHPLVP LV \HW RQH
more mission for the teacher of religious education. The contours of this debate are much 
older, reaching back to the age old debates about the autonomy of secular reason and the 
necessity for faith. -RKQ0LOEDQN¶VLQLWLDWLRQRIWKHWKHRORJLFDOPRYHPHQWNQRZQDVµRadical 
Orthodoxy¶ with his provocative thesis in Theology and Social Theory (1992) was an 
important moment in recognising the ways that secular theories of religion have come to 
position theology, though, as Milbank himself argues at length, theologians have long 
claimed a distinctively theological space that resists reductive interpretations of religion in 
political, social, or cultural terms. In view of the provocations of Milbank, Gearon and others, 
the concerns of this article are wide, seeking to acknowledge again the secular framing of 
theology, but linking particularly with the sphere of education, more particularly that of 
religious education as a curriculum subject. There is a complex history and vast literature 
addressing religious education, to which I will refer only as necessary.2 The debates between 
Gearon and Jackson are primarily concerning religious education, but the concerns raised 
therein speak to a far wider and more complex set of philosophical considerations. Firstly, I 
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will introduce Gearon and Jackson and the recent debate between them. This will require 
some discussion of the intentions behind religious education as a subject, and will involve 
ZLGHUGHEDWHVWKDWVLQFHWKHHPHUJHQFHRIDµSRVW-VHFXODU¶WXUQLQUHOLJLRXVVWXGLHVOLHEHKLQG
those curriculum discussions.  
 
 
2. INTRODUCING THE DEBATE 
 
Robert Jackson and Liam Gearon are both prominent figures among the debates about 
religious education in the UK and beyond. Jackson was director of the Warwick Religions 
and Education Research Unit from 1994 to 2012 and, since 2002, was a leading contributor to 
WKH &RXQFLO RI (XURSH¶V SURMHFWV DURXQG UHOLJLRXs and inter-cultural education, providing a 
key perspective for the development of the Toledo guiding principles on teaching about 
religions and beliefs in public schools (OSCE/ODIHR 2007). -DFNVRQ¶V DELOLW\ WR EXLOG
bridges between policy, research and practice is clear, though perhaps coming at some cost, 
since the ability to achieve this kind of mutual understanding about the purposes and 
possibilities of religious education may entail significant practical conflicts and compromises. 
Gearon has been tracing the relations between religion, citizenship and education at least 
since 2002, though has taken up the questions of the securitisation and politicisation or 
religious education since around 2012. As Associate Professor of Education and Senior 
Research Fellow at Oxford University, Gearon has made significant contributions to these 
debates, though I will focus on his criticisms of the particular ways in which religious 
education as a curriculum subject in the UK and Europe has come to be framed and justified. 
In short, Gearon is critical of what he perceives as the secularised political framing of 
religious education, a framing which does not, in his view, help us to understand the 
phenomenon of religion on its own terms. Gearon suggests that one of the most important 
research projects on religious education of recent years illustrates this problematic framing of 
religion. He has in mind a 1.2 million Euro EU funded project known as REDCo (Religion in 
Education. A contribution to dialogue or a factor of conflict in transforming societies of 
European Countries),3 which ran from 2006-2009 and involved the collaboration of nine 
European universities. The lead researcher and author for the REDCo project in the UK was 
Robert Jackson, who since 2015, has directly responded to *HDURQ¶s criticisms in thoughtful 
ways. In what follows, I draw attention to some of the insights contained on both sides of this 
debate along with developing some critical points that the debate itself presupposes. 
 
Addressing the frequent proclamations of the resurgence of religion over recent years, 
Gearon is justified in askingµIf God is back, on whose terms? His response is unequivocal: 
µI contend that it is in terms of political and not religious discourse, for the former (in 
arguments over citizenship, democracy or human rights) predominantly frames the latter 
(2012, p. 153). In other words, religious education as it exists in the UK and across Europe, is 
primarily framed and justified by a secularized political discourse which does not help us 
understand the nature of religion on its own terms. Gearon is less explicit about why the 
political framing of religious discourse in education is necessarily problematic, or why the 
extension of secularization should be such a concern, tending to let the implications speak for 
themselves.4 This might lead to misunderstanding, especially as many readers are likely to be 
schooled in the kind of secular social theories he wishes to keep distinct from theological 
GLVFRXUVH,WVHUYHV*HDURQ¶VSXUSRVHLQGHYHORSLQJWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWWKLVSROLWLFDOIUDPLQJ 
of religion is interpreted as an extension of secularization, since through its connections with 
Rousseau, Durkheim and Bellah, the concept of µcivil religion¶ D TXDVL-religious 
commitment to a state) LOOXVWUDWHV *HDURQ¶V JHQHUDO argument. Jackson denies that this 
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criticism  can be applied to the REDCo project (Jackson, 2011; 2015). Despite problems with 
*HDURQ¶VDFFRXQW,DPJHQHUDOO\ sympathetic with his concern that secularisation structures 
our understanding of religion in general and filters down through to our interpretations of the 
connections between religion and education. His more developed discussion of the secular 
framing of religious understanding by Ninian Smart and Williams James (Gearon 2013a, 
Chapter 5) provides some wider context for the more specific politicisation of religious 
education. Gearon is particularly concerned that the REDCo pURMHFWLVµoriented towards civil 
religion and thus to political, secular, even (and though the empirical grounds of its effects 
are difficult to measure) secularising goals, whether such ends were intended or not¶ (Gearon 
2012, p. 152). In assessing this debate between Gearon (2012; 2013a) and Jackson (2015) 
about the framing of religious education and its apparent social utility, I will try to expose 
key assumptions on both sides. 
 
 
3. :+$7¶6:521*:,7+72/(5$1&(5(63(&7$1'+80$15,*+76" 
 
In understanding the ways that secularised discourses have structured the spaces of religious 
education, we turn to the principles of modern liberal governance, namely, tolerance, respect 
and human rights. It is perhaps not surprising that teachers of religious education are happy to 
present the subject as promoting tolerance, respect, human rights, citizenship, moral 
development and so on. After all, the subject (at least in much of the UK) has long been 
fragile, its place on the national curriculum being far from assured. The history of the subject 
in the UK mirrors many of the theological and philosophical tensions that religious and 
cultural pluralism seem to raise: namely, that in responding to ethnic diversity from the 
¶V RQZDUGV religious education has been regarded by some culturally conservative 
critics as complicit in eroding the shared national identity tied to a particular theological 
history (Parker and Freathy 2012). Beyond the utility of general political and social cohesion, 
religious education has more recently come to be justified in terms of security issues and 
geopolitics (Gearon 2013b). The fractured and polarised state of contemporary geopolitics 
requires us to seek ways to increase religious literacy and to prevent µextremism¶ and 
µUDGLFDOLVDWLRQ¶ Surely an aim of religious education should be to contribute to religious 
literacy, even if recent research shows it has not been very successful in this aim (Conroy et 
al. 2013). The danger is, however, that these justifications for religious education are framed 
by a particular conception of the nature of religion. In short, religion comes to be positioned 
by the secular. The encounter between the different religious views, for instance, is 
predicated on a kind of dogmatic pluralism which tolerates religion as long as it remains 
within the individual private realm of conscience and makes minimal claims on public life. 
Here the exclusivism and absolutism of religious traditions must conform to the epistemic 
categories defined by pluralist philosophers of religion (Hick 2004). This ostensibly 
reasonable and inclusive framing of religion which places it in the private sphere, ensures that 
the political principles of tolerance and respect define how religion is understood. Tolerance 
and respect are presented here as political principles because of their cohesive utility, and so 
the political concerns to live peaceably trump religious ideas that often entail some kind of 
relation with transcendence. In this way, the religious education classroom tends to inculcate 
children and young people not into a particular religious tradition or theology, which, in post-
confessional religious education (where religious education is no longer thought to declare 
and foster particular beliefs) has become distinctly suspect (Gearon 2013a, Chapter 5). 
Rather, children are inculcated into the presumption of pluralism - tolerance, respect, human 
rights ± principles which reflect the secularised politicisation of our ultimate concerns. From 
this perspective, the construction of a liberal regime of truth eclipses the theological, and 
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silences serious theological engagement. One might say we are precisely educated out of 
being religious rather than into it because the real lesson here is that nothing ultimately is at 
stake since everyonH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHLVHTXDOO\YDOLG. Gearon sees in this a clear alignment of 
the pedagogical and the political: µthe pedagogical imperative of multi-faith teaching to 
DGGUHVV (XURSH¶V UHOLJLRXV SOXUDOLVP LV DOVR D political imperative to address the needs of 
peaceful democratic coexistHQFHDPLGVW UHOLJLRXVSOXUDOLVP¶ (Gearon 2012, p. 156DXWKRU¶V
emphasis). The result is that µwithin two generations Europe has transformed close to two 
millennia of Christian identity into a plural, multi-faith orientation in its religious education 
V\VWHPV¶ (Gearon 2012, p. 156).  
 
Apart from raising questions about relatively recent European identity being so 
straightforwardly aligned with a singular Christian identity, one could ask Gearon, so what? 
If religious education finds its purpose in helping communities understand one another and 
get along, then that might be cause for celebration, particularly in such fractured times. 
Jackson responds to *HDURQ¶VFULWLFLVPV by replying that they are predicated on an essentialist 
view of religion that compels an unrealistically hygienic separation between politics and 
religion. The epistemic problem of the µfuzzy-edges¶ of religious practices and identities that 
-DFNVRQ¶V 5('&R project seems methodologically attached to, may prove unacceptable to 
the well-defined and rigorous authority of religions as institutional bodies (Gearon 2013a, p. 
131). But whether religious identities can be firmly fixed or must remain porous and open-
ended, one cannot avoid questions of hermeneutics, nor dismiss the possibility that 
deconstruction or even mystification have an important place within religious institutions. 
*HDURQ PLJKW IRU LQVWDQFH FRPSODLQ WKDW -RKQ +LFN¶V UHOLJLRXV SOXUDOLVP HQFRXUDJHV D
relativistic or postmodern negation of the meaning of religion *HDURQ LGHQWLILHV +LFN¶V
position as a theology that mirrors political liberalism (Gearon 2013a, p. 134)), but Hick need 
not be interpreted as a relativist in these terms. In any case, if religious education has been 
reduced to politics, it is not clear what, if anything, has been lost or excluded. *HDURQ¶V
invocations of T. S, Eliot and Friedrich Schleiermacher (Gearon 2013a, pp. 26-28), for 
example, seem to speak to those disposed to accept his theological presuppositions (which 
seem to assume a Christian theological orientation). The general structure of *HDURQ¶V
argument is reminiscent of the criticisms of WKHGHLVWLFµUHGXFWLRQ¶RIWKHJRVSHOWRPRUDOLW\
that some commentators accuse, for example, Leo Tolstoy of (Christoyannopoulos, 2016). 
But one might equally interpret the more inclusive liberal theology as another chapter in the 
history of theological innovation. That said, Gearon¶V argument about the reduction of 
religion to the political is both plausible and of concern if we are interested in understanding 
religions on their own terms. But I detect a deeper problem of reductionism, one that Gearon 
does not explore.  
 
In what follows I will argue that there is a subtler framing of this debate between Gearon and 
Jackson, namely that religion is assumed to be about commitments to a set of beliefs, 
propositional truth claims, or worldviews. The propositional framing of religion has wide 
influence among those interested in the places of religion in education, including the religious 
education classroom. It can be detected within many debates about indoctrination, or 
competing rights between children, parents, religious communities, and nation states, where 
religious identity is assumed to be about a commitment to a set of beliefs or truth claims, 
resulting in an opposition between those who see religious identity as entailing an absolute 
commitment (Wright 2004), and those who accommodate more pluralist conceptions of 
religious identity. Although the propositional framing of religion has been critically discussed 
(Williams 2012; Smith 1962; Smith 1987; ,¶$QVRQ and Jasper 2011) it continues to go 
largely unexamined among debates across religion and education (REMOVED). This 
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narrowed perspective of religious identity leads to an overly rationalised and voluntaristic 
conception of religious subjectivity, which is subsequently interpreted in terms of a subject 
who makes decisions concerning faith (Brown 2013). This propositional framing tends to 
elide important dimensions of religion: the intrinsic aesthetics of religious life, or the way 
practices are undertaken without a clear metaphysical or theological basis. In general, this 
obscures what might be broadly termed an aesthetic or hermeneutic view of religion. Some 
might be inclined to associate this with the liberal theology that responded to the 
Enlightenment, though I would suggest these hermeneutic and aesthetic approaches are part 
of an older tradition, a discussion that is beyond the scope of this article. An aesthetic 
framing of religious identity would foreground a range of practices, experiences, and 
sensibilities that do not presume an exclusive or absolute commitment. The Hindu who 
worships Christ, Buddha, Krishna, and other local deities offers an image of religious 
inclusion that sidesteps many of the problems of indoctrination, or of competing truth claims. 
 
In what follows I will suggest some connections between this propositional framing of 
religion and how the debate between Gearon and Jackson addresses the influence of 
secularism. To some extent the propositional framing is itself a product of an Enlightenment 
µUDWLRQDOLVW¶YLHZRIZKDWLWPHDQVWREH human, and therefore also religious, though perhaps 
its roots are better traced back to Protestant voluntarism. I would argue, then, that a more 
thoroughgoing analysis of the influence of secularism upon religious education might identify 
this propositional framing of religion as further evidence of the influence of the secular.5 So, 
although Gearon might have more to gain from the argument that a propositional reduction of 
religious life is partly a result of a secular framing of religion, neither Gearon nor Jackson 
seem concerned to question the idea that religion is about believing certain things or adopting 
a religious worldview. Before we develop the implications of the propositional framing of the 
GHEDWHWKHUHDUHVRPHRWKHULPSRUWDQWGLPHQVLRQVWR*HDURQ¶VDQDO\VLVto consider. 
 
 
4. COUNTER-SECULARISATION OR THE POST-SECULAR? 
 
Gearon challenges the core conjecture within recent trends in European religious education 
µthat the predominant political interest in religion within education is evidence of counter-
VHFXODULVDWLRQ¶ (2012, p. 151). The term counter-secularisation is an unfortunate one, seeming 
to derive from Peter Berger¶V LQIOXHQtial but broad use of the term (Berger 1999). But it 
suggests something like an intentional reversal of secularizing forces, akin to what Rowan 
Williams has critically referred to as a µrestorationist religiosity¶ (Williams 2012, p. 22). The 
resurgence of religiosity across China, India, the US, Russia and so on (all of which are 
putatively secular states), can hardly be presented as a coherent reversal of the forces of 
secularization. Each nation and culture has very particular circumstances with respect to 
secularizing forces, and their impact upon education.6 It is important to note, here, that 
secularization refers to a set of historical processes aligned with :HEHU¶VFHOHEUDWHGFRQFHSW
of disenchantment, a concept too often assumed to be linear as culminDWLQJ LQ D µVHFXODU¶
state. Painting with an inevitably broad brush, Gearon seems concerned to acknowledge the 
important point that secularization is not a linear process and there are plenty of accounts that 
seek to complicate overly simplistic linear secularization theses. It is odd, therefore, that 
Gearon sees the need to polarize what appears to be a secularization argument against his use 
of the term counter-secularisation. A brief examination of the secular will help to explain 
why counter-secularisation is such a misleading term. 
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In contrast to the notion of a historical and progressive secularization, secularism (to say 
nothing of the post- or counter-secular) properly understood is opposed not to religion but 
only state sanctioned religiosity, and so should not be conflated with irreligion or atheism. It 
is a political doctrine that opposes the political authority of religion (Blair 2010, p. 23; 
Sullivan 2012, p. 185; Williams 2012, chapter 2). This might sound like a straightforward 
idea until we look at examples of secular states. Perhaps French laïcité provides the clearest 
implementation of this political arrangement. But as James Arthur has argued, the French 
model is a long way from a consistent separation of Church and State (Arthur et al. 2010, p. 
16).7 Compare also the laïcité of modern Turkey, where religious influence on public life 
seems to be in the ascendant as the limits of the secular reveal itself and the Muslim majority 
express their view that religion has a public face. So there are important distinctions between 
secularism as a political doctrine, the secular as an epistemic category, and the historical 
process or secularization LQ ZKLFK DV VRFLHWLHV µSURJUHVV¶ DQG PRGHUQL]H UHOLJLRQ ORVHV LWV
cultural and social significance (Casanova 2009). With this in mind it is worth examining 
how Gearon employs the term.  
 
Gearon quotes the REDCo project leader Wolfram Weisse who states: 
 
In most European countries, we have assumed for a long time that increasing 
secularisation would lead to a gradual retreat of religion from public space. This 
tendency has reversed itself in the course of the past decade as religion has returned to 
public attention (Gearon 2012, p. 151). 
 
Jackson (2015, p. 347) is correct to point out that Weisse is not saying here that current 
practices within European religious eGXFDWLRQ SUHVHQW µdecisive evidence of counter-
VHFXODULVDWLRQ¶ as Gearon claims. Jackson points out that Weisse never actually uses the term 
counter-secularisation, using rather µSRVW-VHFXODULVP¶DQG even then, only occasionally. It is 
problematic that Gearon here relies on a binary between secularisation and its counter. The 
problem is, that secularisation has so many resonances and layers, that any argument that 
calls attention to its reversal is goiQJWRUXQLQWRSUREOHPV7KLVLVZK\WKHµSRVW-VHFXODU¶ is a 
better term because it does not deny, counter or reverse the secular, rather the post-secular 
complicates the secular (just as the postmodern complicates rather than reverses the modern). 
*HDURQ¶s argument that the political frames the religious is worth developing, but does not 
need to posit an extension or reversal of an essentialised secularism. The REDCo project 
PLJKW UHLQIRUFHFHUWDLQµVHFXODULVLQJ¶ assumptions about the nature of religion, but whether 
WKLVLVDSUREOHPRUDQLQQRYDWLRQGHSHQGVXSRQRQH¶VWKHRORJLFDORULHQWDWLRQ. There is a big 
difference, for example, between what Rowan Williams characterises as the programmatic 
secularism that excludes religions from public life tout court, and a more inclusive procedural 
secularism in which religious and non-religious perspectives make equal contributions to 
public life without any particular contribution enjoying a privileged position. In this 
procedural form, many religious figures would agree with Williams that secularism µPXVWQRW
EHDOORZHGWRIDLO¶ (2012, p. 11), since the secular is designed to protect religion as much as 
the state. These political forms of the secular are quite different from the secular as epistemic 
category (see Asad 2003, p. 1), or indeed as a historical process. So, what exactly is the 
problem of religious education extending the political doctrine that establishes the space for a 
secularised encounter with religion? A secular (but not quite neutral) view of religious life 
may not offer a fulsome phenomenology of religion that µUHDO¶ religious understanding 
involves (but when does schooling ever succeed in bringing students to a fulsome 
phenomenology of anything?!). There are clearly important political dimensions to religion 
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that must be understood, now more than ever, and the post-secular offers an opportunity to 
excavate some of the layers of meaning with which religion has been loaded. 
 
So the post-secular might be best interpreted as some kind of complication of the secular, a 
µFULVLVRIIDLWK¶ZLWKLQVHFXODULVPLWVHOI+DEHUPDVRU µdisenchantment with the very 
LGHD RI GLVHQFKDQWPHQW¶ (Vattimo 2003, p. 30). The post-secular is µnot secular, nor is it 
exactly religious, or non-religious - certainly not in the familiar ways we have been 
accustomed to understand these terms¶ (Ergas 2015). The many forms of the (post-)secular 
(for they resist definition) help us to recognize the layered nature of religious (and non-
religious) experience, understanding, and identity and their inextricability from politics, 
culture, and history.8 In his rejoinder to Gearon, Jackson does not draw on the important 
resources implied in this complexity around the (post)-secular. But clearly the idea that a 
conception of religion unsullied by any cultural or political influence would require such a 
stringent and exclusive essentialism that I wonder if Gearon would have to acknowledge that 
his account is rather idealistic. Perhaps Gearon could have been more careful in developing 
the case that religious education has been usurped by a political discourse that reduces 
religion to political and social issues of tolerance, citizenship, human rights and so on. But as 
UREXVW DQG FRPSUHKHQVLYH DV -DFNVRQ¶V UHMRinder to Gearon appears to be, it misses the 
fundamental point that Gearon is getting at, a point that is more general than his criticisms of 
REDCo implies.9 -DFNVRQLVMXVWLILDEO\FULWLFDORIDVSHFWVRI*HDURQ¶Vassessment of REDCo, 
but the substantial concern of the politicisation and securitisation of education remains a 
problem for understanding religion.  
 
My main argument is that the debate between Jackson and Gearon (along with much that is 
written around both religious education in the curriculum, as well as broader discussions 
around the relations between religion and education) is itself framed by other hidden 
assumptions about the nature of religion, and so the social theory lens by which religion is 
interpreted, is itself derivative of DSDUWLFXODUµRQWRORJ\¶RIUHOLJLRQDUHGXFtive conception of 
what is means to be religious. *HDURQ¶VDQDO\VLV too strongly asserts the intrinsic nature of 
religious education, and overdraws the distinction between understanding religion itself and 
sociological analysis of religion. We have already noted that this leads Jackson to charge 
Gearon with theological essentialism. I suggest one way of challenging (or deconstructing) 
this charge: by showing that religions are less constituted by beliefs or worldviews in a 
straightforward sense, which will shift ideas around tolerance, respect and (competing) rights. 
The framing of religion in political terms may itself be derivative of a propositional framing 
of religion in terms of beliefs and worldviews. This is because the very notion that religious 
education must entail a particular form of pluralism, takes for granted that there are plural 
belief systems that are essentially different. It assumes that people stand for, or identify 
themselves as holding particular beliefs or doctrinal positions which are in tension and 
contradiction with other views. At the sharp end, these different belief systems are regarded 
in exclusivist and absolutist terms, being both inviolable and irreconcilable. In political terms 
this appears to thrust upon us an unpalatable choice between some kind of theocracy or 
secularism. Gearon, along with others (Wright 2004, Barnes 2006), does not wish to erode 
the central meaning of religious life: that something true, or real is at stake. A commitment to 
a kind of bland pluralism is in danger of eroding the meaning of religion itself. Barnes and 
Wright take this further with their view that religious difference is not the problem of 
religious understanding, but its presupposition, because religious identities are what they are 
through the absolute claims that they make.  
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5. PLURALISM OR CONFLICT? 
 
Pluralism, from the outset, appears to be based on certain presuppositions about the nature of 
religious truth that frame religious education as an activity that is fundamentally 
compromised. The compromise is that the acknowledgement of many truths is the erosion of 
the lived experience of a commitment to truth as such. As soon as different religious 
perspectives come together, one either accepts pluralism or endures conflict. This is the logic 
of what has been called the µpropositional frame¶ when applied to religion in education 
(REMOVED 2016, Chapter 3). The enlightened objectivity of social theories precludes the 
existential commitment of the religious subject, replacing the absolutism with pluralism or 
relativism. Surely to understand another religious perspective requires not only that we 
suspend our own religious beliefs (as phenomenologists of religion like Ninian Smart have 
suggested), but that we more radically suspend the judgment that assumes this is just one 
truth among many (Barnes 2006). But if we do try to accept the truth claims made by 
religious subjects, then, the inevitable outcome will be conflict. Does Gearon not have to 
defend his commitment to religious essentialism from the charge that it leads to inevitable 
conflict? 
 
Gearon claims that secularised religious education is looking for the common ground that 
people share, and therefore will not be in a position to explore and emphasise the differences 
that matter. This is surely a danger for the practices of religious education but is questionable 
both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, secularised political religious education 
should be in a position to emphasise religious difference more effectively than confessional 
religious education because those differences do not need to have implications for public life. 
From this perspective, difference does not necessarily lead to conflict, as Gearon suggests 
(Gearon 2013, p. 133) but its existence is, in fact, an argument for secular religious 
education. Moreover, the need for respect for plurality does not need to involve an impossible 
epistemic compromise, but might rather offer a practical option. It is a mistake to regard the 
praxis of religious education in which many people of various religious affiliations sit 
alongside one another as indicating an inevitable epistemic compromise or failure. The 
problems arise when we take religion to be primarily about commitment to propositional 
beliefs and worldviews. Looking at the empirical case, Jackson offers a good deal of 
HYLGHQFHWRFRXQWHU*HDURQ¶VFODLPVWKDWWKHSROLWLFDOSDUDGLJPILOWHUVRXWFRQIOLFW'UDZLQJ
on cases from England, Russia, Norway, Germany, and Estonia, Jackson argues that, 
 
an examination of actual REDCo research reports, related to students, teachers and 
classroom interaction studies, shows that, rather than avoiding issues of conflict in 
UHODWLRQ WR UHOLJLRQ WKH\KDYHPXFK WR UHYHDODERXW VWXGHQWV¶H[SHULHQFHDQGDERXW
how conflict can be managed and used constructively in the classroom (Jackson 2015, 
p. 350) 
 
Having just argued for a secular religious education that embraces difference, I have to 
complicate matters by acknowledging that the secular is by no means a neutral space. Indeed, 
there are reasons to suppose that contemporary formations of the secular privilege certain 
groups. William Connolly puts it as follows µsecularism is not merely the division between 
public and private realms that allows religious diversity to flourish in the latter. It can itself 
EHDFDUULHURIKDUVKH[FOXVLRQV$QGLWVHFUHWHVDQHZGHILQLWLRQRI³UHOLJLRQ´WKDWFRQFHDOV
some of its most problematic practices from itself¶ (Connolly 2006, p. 75). To this extent, I 
appreciate *HDURQ¶V FRQFHUQ DERXW WKH VHFXODU IRUPDWLRQ of politicised religious education 
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which seems motivated by the new definition of religion that the liberal polity imposes. But 
my preference has been to appeal to the complex post-secular over counter-secularisation. 
 
 
6. THE HISTORICAL-POLITICAL PARADIGM 
 
Jackson suggests that the wide range of researchers employed by REDCo from diverse 
academic disciplines refutes *HDURQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQRIDSUHYDLOLQJWKHRORJLcal outlook derived 
from a particular secularising political paradigm (Jackson 2015, p. 350). But in this response 
Jackson seems to underestimate the extent to which social theory permeates our 
interpretations of religious phenomena in ways that precede the explicit theorising 
undertaken by the REDCo team. In other words, a variety of religious perspectives might 
conceal a hegemonic framing of religion by the secular. To illustrate the significance of the 
unseen forces that structure our (secular) interpretations of the world, consider Charles 
7D\ORU¶V influential conception of secularism. Taylor points out that the real significance of 
secularism is not the containment of belief to the private sphere (secularity 1) or the decline 
in belief itself (secularity 2), but a shift in the conditions of belief which have made unbelief 
viable (secularity 3). Those changing conditions are visible only by way of their effects, by 
what they make possible (i.e. unbelief) and form the real substance of his analysis (Taylor 
2007). 7D\ORU¶V account directs attention to what structures our interpretations of religion 
(and education) requiring us to consider the conception of religion (and education) as such. 
Another approach involves a more fundamental hermeneutics of religious education to 
H[SRVH WKRVH LPSOLFLW VWUXFWXUHV WKDW µDOZD\V DOUHDG\¶ IUDPH WKH GHEDWH (Aldridge 2015). 
*HDURQ¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI SDUDGLJPV PLJKW DOVR EHQHILW IURP PRUH H[SOLFLW analysis of the 
implicit.  It is perhaps a justifiable speculation to suggest that researchers engaged in 
quantitative and qualitative empirical research as part of the REDCo project are more likely 
to draw on sociological interpretations than theological methodologies, such as hermeneutics. 
This speculation that empirical researchers and social theorists have a theoretical grounding 
which is intrinsically secularising might be a step too far, but at least illustrates what is meant 
by the implicit framing of religious education. 
 
As a student of Ninian Smart, Gearon is bound to be DZDUH RI 6PDUW¶V PXOWL-dimensional 
phenomenology of religion (Gearon 2013a, p. 112). Yet *HDURQ¶VFRQFHSWLon of religion, at 
least with respect to the question of belief, is fairly conventional. To show how religion once 
mattered to people, Gearon quotes the venerable Bede who recounts an Anglo-Saxon king 
ZKRµused to sit alone for hours at a time, earnestly debating with himself what he ought to 
do and what religion he should follow¶ (Bede quoted by Gearon 2013a, p. 1). Religion is 
presented as a doctrinal issue or a question of decision, and a decision for one is a decision 
against something else. This exclusivist view of religion is associated with the role of 
religious education in schools of a religious character which, for Gearon, have the advantage 
that they begin from the starting point of faith (Gearon 2013a, p. 143). By contrast, state 
sponsored education proceeds on the basis of reason, and that defines the Enlightenment 
project¶s conception of religious education: that religion must be critically examined by 
reason. The problem with the opposition of faith and reason within religious education is that 
it leaves the fundamental cognitivist and propositional account of religion itself unexamined.  
 
 
7. UNDERSTANDING RELIGION 
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,KDYHDWWHPSWHGWRVKRZWKDW*HDURQ¶VFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHSROLWLFLVDWLRQDQGVHFXULWLVDWLRQRI
religious education reflect deeper framings of the place of religion within education. This has 
meant that the discussion which began within the established debates around religious 
education as a curriculum subject, need to move to more marginal inquiries about the 
ontology and epistemology that underpin and shape those curriculum debates. I have 
discussed the framing of the debate, but have drawn also on other theorists who work is, in 
that sense, on the PDUJLQV KHQFH WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI 7D\ORU¶V DQDO\VLV RI WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI
belief (Taylor 2007). Whether one regards this as marginal depends, of course, on deeper 
philosophical commitments. This question could be approached ontologically, as Heidegger 
spent his entire career doing, or by way of deconstruction as Derrida showed, or even through 
D:LWWJHQVWHLQLDQUHIHUHQFHWRWKDWZKLFKFDQEHVKRZQEH\RQGµVD\LQJ¶ Here the margins of 
ontological inquiry become the central issues at stake. We might, therefore, invoke a 
WKHRORJ\DIWHU+HLGHJJHU¶V critique of onto-theology, a Derridean religion without religion, or 
a Wittgensteinian silence. The references here to Heidegger, Derrida, and Wittgenstein are 
evocative of a concern with language as a foundational issue of religious identity. A key 
argument of this article concerns the assumptions about religious identity: that religions are 
not primarily about propositional truth claims, and debates between religious perspectives do 
not start with the propositional expression of internal commitments. Therefore, concerns 
about indoctrination or competing rights and claims among plural positions, often miss the 
point of the place of religion in education. To develop this argument further, I would like to 
blur the faith/reason belief/unbelief boundaries by showing how language in religion has 
important performative aspects. I do not have space to fully develop this and the associated 
FULWLTXH RI YROXQWDULVP EXW LW¶V UHOLDQFH RQ D :HVWHUQ 3URWHVWDQW FRQFHSWLRQ RI UHOLJLRXV
identity should be noted.10 The discussion could, therefore, move in a more philosophical 
direction by arguing that the problems in religious education are significantly attributable to 
assumptions around religious language. So, I will only briefly address the performative 
QDWXUH RI UHOLJLRXV DQG WKHRORJLFDO ODQJXDJH WR LQGLFDWH WKH µRQWRORJLFDO¶ GLUHFWLRQ WKDW WKH
Gearon/Jackson debate might move to. 
 
If religious statements are not GLUHFWO\SURSRVLWLRQDOLVLWEHWWHUWRFDOOWKHPµSHUIRUPDWLYH¶
statements that perform particular actions, often through significant symbolic interaction? 
The SHUIRUPDWLYH DVSHFWV RI WKHRORJLFDO ODQJXDJH DUH ZLWQHVVHG LQ )UHGHULFN &RSOHVWRQ¶V
claim that for Aquinas, religious language is often concerned to awaken reverence, rather 
than transmit information. More recently Jean-Luc Marion has made similar arguments about 
Augustine, that in the Confessions µ$XJXVWLQHGRHVQRWVRPXFKVSHDNof God as he speaks to 
*RG¶ 0DULRQ  S  7KH EDVLF PHVVDJH KHUH LV WKDW WKH WH[WV FUHHGV SUD\HUV DQG
doctrines can be seen as spiritual exercises and practices rather than truth claims. The 
tensions between kerygmatic and apologetic theology, the longstanding debates between 
science and religion, and the revival of reductive (literalist and fundamentalist) theologies 
that are witnessed in the contemporary geo-political landscape, have encouraged a more 
propositional account of theological language that must be brought into question. 
 
Moreover, each religious tradition seems to operate within its own discursive logic, within, 
its own language game. In his attempt to establish conviviality among different religions, 
Anri Morimoto says, 
 
An often-quoted Hindu phrase has it right: The absolute Brahman is "the One without 
the Second."  The object of their devotion comes to the very first, not in comparison 
with the second or the third, not in a relative sense, but in the absolute sense.  Saying 
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"my God is supreme," therefore, does not necessarily mean that other ways are 
"secondary," let alone "mistaken" or "defective."   Other ways are simply irrelevant to 
the person speaking.  They constitute different language games which he or she has 
no ready access to evaluate.  The believer gives total devotion to his or her own way, 
and it is beyond the person's concern whether or not there are other ways for other 
people to be saved.  Inexorably existential and personal, all it means is: "as far as I am 
concerned, I was saved by this God, and therefore I give thanks to this God" 
(Morimoto 2005, p. 180). 
 
For Morimoto, not only is religious language performative, but each language game is, in a 
certain sense, incommensurable, playing by its own rules. It is an aesthetic performance, an 
expression, and a devotion. The association of the poststructural performative language 
theory with medieval theology orients us to the soteriological concern of religious discourse 
that supercedes (without negating) the metaphysical interest. In other words, theologians are 
concerned less with the coherence and meaning that might be established through more or 
less correct representations of things (worldly or divine), than with a remedy or healing of 
our relation to God and the world. This account offers perhaps a rather limited conception of 
metaphysics, but the soteriological emphasis brings us to what the discourse is doing rather 
than saying. We might similarly ask what the statement of the creed does, as what it says. 
There are dangers here that a binary is established, that saying is read only in performative 
WHUPV DV WKRXJK WKH SXWDWLYH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO µFRQWHQW¶ KDV QR EHDULQJ ZKDWVRHYHU WKDW
doctrines stand for nothing; that texts lose any stability and so forth. I have no desire to 
replace a tyranny of the rationalist and propositional reduction with the total denial of any 
form of stable content, or a claim that understanding should not be reductive. Representation 
and its correlate reductions are, particularly in the realm of pedagogy, essential though never 
final. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
Perhaps the real question in the context of the Gearon/Jackson debate is whether the 
soteriological intention of liberal politics, to live peaceably together, is sufficient for religious 
education. Possibly Jackson and Gearon would agree that this is one dimension without being 
sufficient. Even so, does it need a theological consummation? Are there cracks in the secular 
rendering this political intention always ideological? Or is political ideology itself just a 
secularization of idolatry? *HDURQ¶V SURYRFDWLRQ DERXW WKH FUHHS RI VHFXODULVDWLRQ LV ZRUWK
paying attention to. But, despite his criticisms of the putative counter-secularisation of 
REDCo, he seems intent on countering the secular rather than engaging with its 
complications. For Gearon, religious life seems to be orLHQWHG WRDFWLRQ LQ WKLVZRUOG µonly 
insofar as action here ensures salvation, this life in other words in preparation for the 
judgement, punLVKPHQW DQG UHZDUGV RI WKH QH[W¶ (Gearon 2013a, p. 176), and he seems 
ambivalent about whether religious education should be similarly oriented. It may be that the 
act of attention within the very particular classrooms of religious education across Europe 
and the world, are the places where the performance of the political and the theological are 
found alongside one another, without distinction or reduction. 
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1 The insider/outsider problem has particular provenance within religious studies and anthropology. Space does 
not permit me to consider the question in more detail but I must note WKDW*HDURQ¶VUHIHUHQFHVto debates around 
whether an outsider can understand a religious worldview seem predicated on an unhelpful dichotomy between 
those who are inside or outside that itself derives from a secularised conception of religious identity (Taylor 
2007). In a certain sense, we are all outsiders, insiders, and transgressors, but the comfortable fiction of those 
within and those left out persists. 
2 The literature addressing the history and significance of religious education as a curriculum subject in the 
British context is vast. Freathy and Parker provide a comprehensive and recent account that addresses many of 
the issues raised in this article, particularly the influences of secularism and humanism on the formation of 
religious education in Britain in an increasingly liberal and democratic society (Freathy and Parker 2013). 
3 For an overview of the REDCo project, see 
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ces/research/wreru/research/completed/redco/ 
4 Jackson presents his own explanationµReligious education, according to Gearon, by its very nature involves 
VRPHIRUPRILQLWLDWLRQLQWRµWKHUHOLJLRXVOLIH¶WKHYDULRXVH[DPSOHVKHJLYHVUHODWHWRLQLtiation into the 
&KULVWLDQOLIH¶ (Jackson 2015, p. 352). 
5 The influence of secularism on religion in schools has been subject to critical discussion from authors such as 
Terence Copley (2005), Trevor Cooling (2010) and Marius Felderhof (2012) but these discussions tend not to 
unpick the framing of religion itself, which I am attempting to begin here. 
6 A good example is to be found in the Irish Republic where I recently discussed the question of post-secularism 
in relation to education. The initial response from the audience was to point out that since 93% of schools in the 
Republic are controlled by the Catholic church, talk of the µSRVW-VHFXODU¶ZDVSUHPDWXUHZLWKRXWfirst 
establishing the secular. 
7 $UWKXUVKRZVKRZ)UDQFH¶Vlaïceté is not as thoroughgoing across educational institutions as one might 
LPDJLQHµthere are nearly 9,000 Catholic schools in France, many enjoying government subsidy to educate two 
million children. One in three French children, at some stage in their school career, are admitted as students to 
Catholic schools. Indeed, the church controls 95 per cent of all private schools in France and is prepared to 
compromise with the state in order to ensure its continued existence as a provider of Catholic education (Judge 
2002). A number of public schools have Catholic chaplains and religious education can be offered on a 
voluntary basis in some public schools (the Loi 'HEUpRI¶ (Arthur et. Al. 2010, p. 16). 
8 Many political philosophers regard the post-secular as reflecting a general skepticism towards Western 
neocolonial tendencies, inviting a reassessment of the founding myths and assumptions of the Western-led 
international order of the present geopolitical economy (Christoyannopolous 2014). 
9 It should be noted that Jackson is careful to delineate the particular scope of hLVUHMRLQGHUµThe main purpose 
of the present article is not to deny that there are issues about the nature or aims of religious education ± in 
relation to social, political and security concerns, among others ± EXWWRSRLQWRXW*HDURQ¶VPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRI
both REDCo anGWKH7ROHGR*XLGLQJ3ULQFLSOHV¶ (Jackson 2015, p. 346). 
10 $V:HQG\%URZQSXWVLWµ7KHFRQFHLWRIUHOLJLRQDVDPDWWHURILQGLYLGXDOFKRLFH«LVDOUHDG\DGLVWLQFWDQG
distinctly Protestant) way of conceiving religion, one that is woefully inapt for Islam and, I might add, Judaism, 
which is why neither comports easily with the privatized individual religious subject presumed by the 
formulations of religion freedom and tolerance governing Euro-Atlantic modernity¶%URZQ2013, p. 17). 
